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ABSTRACT 
 During the last decade, inherent safety has emerged as an area of interest in both academic and 
industrial research. Various regulatory bodies (including US environment protection agency) have 
enforced the consideration of inherently safer design alternatives. This enforcement, however, may not 
serve the purpose of reducing the frequency of process incidents due to the drawbacks such as risk 
migration associated with inherent design philosophy.  
 This study focuses on analyzing the relationship between inherent safety and reliability as 
chemical project proceeds from initial to later stages of design. The main objective of this research is 
to evaluate the possibility of risk escalation caused due to lowering of system reliability during 
implementation of inherent safety principles applied with an objective to lower the consequence 
element of risk. This lowering of system reliability can increase the likelihood of a process incident, 
thus resulting in an increased risk, ultimately defeating the purpose of applying the inherent design 
philosophy. 
 The developed methodology involves quantifying inherent safety based on the design stage 
under consideration using a quantification technique that utilizes process data available during that 
stage of design. This is followed by determining reliability and availability of the system using 
reliability databases or static reliability modeling for various design alternatives considered during that 
design stage. Lastly, the trend observed between quantified inherent safety and reliability/availability 
is used to determine the required relationship.  
 The application of the developed methodology to process selection stage, conceptual stage, and 
detailed engineering stage reveals that the relationship between inherent safety and reliability (and 
availability) is complicated and varies as per the design stage under consideration. Thus, an important 
conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that an inherently safer design may not be associated 
with higher system reliability and lower risk. 
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 Lastly, the developed methodology is validated for the case study of T2 Laboratories explosion 
and fire. An important observation from these case studies is the ineffectiveness of quantified inherent 
safety in terms of Dow F&EI to capture the severity of situation revealed by detailed reliability analysis.  
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NOMENCLATURE 
NF   -   Flammability score 
NE   -   Explosiveness score  
NT -   Toxicity score 
NR -   Reactivity score 
RT -   Temperature score 
RP -   Pressure score 
RY -   Yield score 
RH -   Heat of reaction score 
PRCSI -   Process reaction and chemical safety index 
ICI -   Individual chemical index 
IRI -   Individual reaction index 
HCI -   Hazardous chemical index 
HRI -   Hazardous reaction index 
OCI -   Overall chemical index 
ORI -   Overall reaction index 
OSI -   Overall safety index 
WCI -   Worst chemical index 
WRI -   Worst reaction index 
TCI -   Total chemical index 
viii 
 
IEQ -   Equipment score 
PESI -   Process equipment safety index 
Nj -   Number of jth equipment 
IEQ,j -   Equipment score of jth equipment 
OPSI -   Overall process safety index 
MTTF -   Mean time to failure 
MTTR -   Mean time to repair 
Ainh -   Inherent availability 
Ainh,i -   Inherent availability of ith equipment 
Ainh,sys -   Inherent availability of system 
FCI -   Fixed capital investment 
OPSIi -   Overall process safety index for ith alternative 
APi -   Annualized profit for ith alternative 
NOPSI,i -   Normalized overall process safety index for ith alternative  
NAP,i -   Normalized annualized profit for ith alternative 
WOPSI -   Weighed overall process safety index for ith alternative 
WAP -   Weighed annualized profit for ith alternative 
IOPSI -   Overall process safety index for ideal solution 
IAP -   Annualized profit for ideal solution 
NIOPSI -   Overall process safety index for non-ideal solution 
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NIAP -   Annualized profit for non-ideal solution 
Ai -   Distance of design alternative from ideal solution  
Bi -   Distance of design alternative from non-ideal solution  
Ri -   Relative closeness of design alternative 
P -   Operating pressure of reactor (atm) 
k -   Reaction constant (s-1) 
MW -   Molecular weight 
M -   Maximum allowable stress of reactor 
X -   Conversion of reaction 
WAo -   Initial mass of A 
WA -   Final mass of A 
FAo -   Initial flow rate of A 
V -   Volume of reactor 
CAo -   Initial concentration of A 
∈ -   coefficient of volume change 
D -   Internal diameter of reactor  
L -   Length of reactor 
r -   Length to diameter ratio of reactor 
Γ -   Residence time of reactor 
𝑣0 -   Initial flow rate of reactor 
x 
 
Pd -   Design pressure of reactor 
t -   Thickness of reactor 
F1 -   General process hazard factor  
F2 -   Special process hazard factor 
F3 -   Process unit hazard factor 
MF -   Material factor 
F&EI -   Fire and explosion index 
Sh -   Mean hoop stress in the reactor 
Si -   Mean induced stress in the reactor 
σh  -   Standard deviation of hoop stress 
σp  -   Standard deviation of operating pressure  
σi  -   Standard deviation of induced stress 
F  -   Failure probability of reactor due to excess pressure 
R  -   Reliability of reactor 
m  -   Integral parameter for determining failure probability of reactor  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Due to the current economic downturn of oil and gas industry, more research impetus has been 
dedicated towards the design of processes that are superior in performance in terms of their profitability. 
A process that is economically superior tends to be generally safer as well, since a safer process has 
lesser downtime and thus, more productivity. The concept of inherent safety has increasingly received 
more importance over the years due to its ability to design processes with reduced hazards. However, 
a process that is inherently safer with respect to process hazards may not be associated with low risk as 
well. To understand this drawback of inherent safety, it is essential to understand the difference between 
hazard and risk. Hazard is defined as the property (physical or chemical) that has the potential to cause 
harm to people, environment or property whereas risk quantifies the level of human injury, 
environmental damage, or economic loss in terms of both the incident probability and the extent of the 
loss or injury (Crowl, 1996). Inherent design philosophy mainly focuses on reducing the consequence 
element of risk (extent of loss) by reducing or minimizing the associated process hazards, generally 
ignoring its effect on the likelihood element. Thus, a process that is inherently safer might have 
increased associated risk due to phenomenon of risk migration caused due to an increase in likelihood 
element.  
This study mainly focuses on a design approach of chemical processes that are inherently safer while 
preventing risk migration by considering the system reliability. The description of the development of 
the methodology, application of developed methodology to case studies, obtained results and 
subsequent analysis followed by conclusions and future work is described in the upcoming chapters. 
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1.2 INHERENT SAFETY 
 Inherent safety is the design philosophy primarily based on reduction and elimination of 
hazards. (Mannan, 2002). The cornerstone of this philosophy was laid after the Flixborough disaster in 
1978 and was put forth in the well-appreciated article by Dr. Kletz, "What you don’t have, can't leak" 
in the 19th Loss prevention symposium of the American institute of chemical engineers (Kletz, 1978). 
This design philosophy differs from the risk-based design approach for design of safer process in the 
sense that risk-based design approach is based towards reducing the likelihood of an incident and/or 
mitigating the consequence element, whereas inherently safer design philosophy is mainly focused on 
hazards associated with the process. 
The principles of inherent safety can be described as follows: 
• Intensification or minimization: reducing the amount of hazardous chemicals involved in the 
process. 
• Substitution: substituting a hazardous chemical in the process with a safer one. The hazards 
associated with a chemical can be related in terms of its flammability, explosiveness, toxicity and 
chemical reactivity. 
• Attenuation or moderation: reducing the severity of the operating conditions (operating temperature 
and pressure) of the process involving hazardous chemicals. 
• Limitation of effects: altering the design (mainly process design and operating conditions) based 
on the hazards associated with the process to limit the effect of hazardous chemicals. 
• Simplicity: designing simpler plants with relatively lesser number of equipment to reduce 
opportunities for failure in the process. 
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1.3 REGULATORY SCENARIO OF INHERENTLY SAFER DESIGN 
Inherent safety has found its way in various regulations by authoritative bodies. Following the 
Bhopal disaster in 1984, the state of New Jersey adapted the toxic catastrophe prevention act in 1985. 
The act was revised in 2003 to include the consideration of inherently safer technologies (ISTs). The 
Contra Costa County in California has enforced the consideration of ISTs for regulation of hazardous 
facilities. Concerned about the threat of terrorist attack on facilities processing hazardous chemicals, 
the U.S Department of Homeland Security considered ISTs as a preventive measure and supplicated 
the center for chemical process safety to provide a scientific definition of inherent safety. In February 
2016, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) put forth a proposal to revise its risk 
management program to include the consideration of safer technologies and alternatives in the process 
hazard assessment for regulation of hazardous industrial facilities. This proposal was disapproved by 
various industrial associations such as US small business administration and American forest and paper 
association primarily due to the difficulty of implementing ISD in existing facilities as compared to the 
design stage of grass-root facilities, however, despite this opposition, the amendment was formally 
accepted by EPA in January 2016. Apart from gaining importance in U.S, inherent safety has received 
subsequent attention in Europe as well. Inherent safety has been listed as a desired characteristic by 
U.K health and safety executive. The European Council directive 96/82/EC of 1996 on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, in its guidance document states, “Hazards 
should be possibly avoided or reduced at source through the application of inherently safe practices.” 
1.4 EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON PROCESS ECONOMY AND 
PROCESS SAFETY 
Reliability is the probability that a system or a component will perform its desired function at the 
required time when used under the appropriate operating conditions whereas, availability is the 
probability that a system or a component will perform its desired function at the required time when 
maintained or operated in the prescribed manner (Ebeling, 1997).  Due to operation of upcoming 
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chemical plants being under severe conditions in large sized equipment to achieve required 
profitability, the associated reliability analysis of such process systems has become increasingly 
complex. This has ultimately led to high risk associated with these facilities. An analysis of the 
occurring process safety incidents revealed that most of these incidents occur during transient 
operations, such as equipment maintenance, startup, and shutdown (Duguid, 1998). Thus, a process 
with lower reliability (and thus, higher maintenance downtime) can be associated with a higher risk. 
Apart from affecting the safety of the chemical plant, reliability controls the downtime (due to 
preventive and corrective maintenance activities) associated with a chemical plant. A plant associated 
with lower system reliability tends to have higher maintenance downtime and thus, lower productivity 
ultimately leading to lower profitability. It is estimated that the loss in revenue resulting from 
unexpected shutdowns in a chemical plant can be within a range of $500 - $100,000 per hour (Tan and 
Kramer, 1997). Therefore, significant profits can be derived from design and implementation of 
technologies with higher system reliability.  
 Various industries have manipulated this relationship to improve the profitability of their 
processing systems. Exxon Mobil in 1994 introduced the reliability and maintenance system program 
which reduced the maintenance cost by $ 30 million (Exxon Mobil, 2001). Shell in its Pulau Bukom 
refining facility in 1996, made design and operational modifications which resulted in a 4-year long 
run of a residue catalytic cracking unit with a minimal of 21 hours of downtime (Shell, 2001). British 
Petroleum saved over $ 1.4 million in pump repairs by escalating the mean time between failure of 
pumps in their facility in Lima, United States (Griffith.J, 1998).   
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CHAPTER II 
PREVIOUS WORK ON PROCESS DESIGN, INHERENT SAFETY, AND EQUIPMENT 
RELIABILITY 
2.1 PROCESS DESIGN AND INHERENT SAFETY 
A considerable depth of study has already been carried out in designing process systems by 
considering inherent safety design philosophy. To effectively understand and quantify the ease of 
implementation and associated hazards of the available design alternatives, various assessment 
methods, and safety indices have been put forth. Prototype index for inherent safety (PIIS) was 
developed with an objective to quantify the inherent safety of chemical process routes (Edward and 
Lawrence, 1993). Dow industries put forth the Dow fire and explosion index (Dow F&EI) aimed at 
quantifying the hazards associated with a process design. The Dow F&EI has received subsequent 
revision over the years and is widely used in process industry. Inherent safety index (ISI) was 
formulated with an aim to provide a simpler method for quantification of inherent safety associated 
with a process design (Heikkila, 1999). Similarly, the i-safe index was developed as a methodology for 
selection of process routes based on inherent safety (Palaniappan, 2002). A significant contribution 
towards quantification of inherent safety was the development of fuzzy logic based index for selection 
of process design alternatives (Gentile, 2003). Apart from focusing only on safety aspects of design 
alternatives, the substance, reactivity, equipment, and safety technology (SREST) layer assessment 
method was developed to include health and environment aspects. The integrated inherent safety index 
(I2SI) was formulated as an improvement to previously developed safety indices (Khan and Amyotte, 
2004). An analysis of the implementation of inherent safety throughout process life-cycle phases was 
carried out effectively using ISI index (Hurme and Rahman, 2005). An important step to include 
personnel safety and process safety for selection of design alternatives was the formulation of Process 
Route Healthiness Index (PRHI) which also focused on health hazards of chemicals involved. A 
significant contribution towards process selection was the evaluation of various methods for assessing 
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the environment, health, and safety hazards in early phases of chemical process design (Adu, 2008). 
Based on statistical analysis, Inherent Benign-ness Indicator (IBI) was developed for comparing 
chemical process alternatives (Srinivasan and Nhan, 2008). A significant deviation from the 
conventional method of using non-dimensional indices for quantification of inherent safety is the 
qualitative assessment for inherently safer design (QAISP) method for application during preliminary 
design. The described methods mainly focused on hazards associated with process design alternatives, 
rather than focusing on the risk associated with these alternatives. This drawback was countered by the 
formulation of the concept of risk- based inherent safety (Rathnayaka, 2014). A comparative analysis 
of the well-known safety indices to assess their agreement with each other as well as with expert 
judgments in various process design stages was subsequently carried out (Kidam, 2008). 
2.2 SELECTION OF ASSESSMENT METHOD FOR QUANTIFICATION OF INHERENT 
SAFETY  
An important theoretical concept was theorized by Dr. Kletz after developing the inherent 
safety philosophy. The concept stated that implementing inherent safety principles (ISP) becomes more 
and more difficult, as the design of the chemical process plant progresses from initial stages of design 
to the later stages (Kletz, 1991). This trend is mainly because major decisions concerning plant and 
process design are taken during earlier stages of plant design. Therefore, it is essential to assess the 
possibility of implementing inherent safety principles as early as possible in the design of chemical 
facilities. However, due to lack of depth of information pertaining to the process during initial stages 
of design, the required evaluation and decision making become difficult. This paradox is referred to as 
the design paradox and is well illustrated in the following figure (Hurme and Rahman, 2005): 
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A possible solution to this design paradox is using different evaluation techniques based on the 
information available in the design stage under consideration. This can be described by the following 
table: 
Design stage  Evaluation technique 
Process R&D Laboratory Screening and Testing 
Conceptual stage ISI, PIIS & i-safe 
Project Stage Suitable Index/Risk assessment method  
Basic engineering Dow F&EI 
Detailed Engineering Dow F&EI 
Procurement 
Fabrication 
Construction 
What-If, Checklist 
Start-up What-If, Checklist 
 
 
Although Dow F&EI has been deemed to perform appreciably well in later stages of process 
design, the formulation of various safety indices for earlier stages of process design such as i-safe index, 
PIIS, ISI, Dow F&EI presents a conundrum. This issue was resolved by a comparative analysis of these 
safety indices (Kidam, 2008).  This study aimed at evaluating the performance of safety indices to 
quantify inherent safety by comparing them to each other and with expert judgments during different 
Opportunities for 
installing inherently safer 
features 
Knowledge of process 
Figure 1: Process design paradox (Hurme and Rahman, 2005)  
Table 1: Inherent safety evaluation techniques (Heikkila, 1999 and Kidam, 2008)  
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stages of design. The results obtained from this study included the R2 value of the correlation of ranking 
of design alternatives obtained from the different safety indices and expert judgment in the case of 
production of methyl methacrylate. The results obtained for the process route selection stage are as 
follows: 
Index PIIS ISI i-safe Expert 
judgement 
Average 
DOW 0.8 0.84 0.89 0.74 0.81 
PIIS  0.94 0.94 0.87 0.89 
ISI   0.96 0.97 0.93 
i-safe    0.9 0.92 
Expert 
judgement 
    0.87 
 
  
 Thus, an important conclusion from this study was that ISI and i-safe index had the strongest 
agreement with other indices and expert judgment (due to higher R2 values) during process route 
selection stage and thus, are suitable during earlier stages of process design. 
2.3 PROCESS DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT RELIABILITY  
Significant depth of research has been carried out in reliability, maintainability and availability 
studies of chemical processing facilities. Reliability analysis of complex systems like chemical piping 
using simplistic Markov models (Gruhn, 1983) have been put forth. A major contribution towards 
analyzing the reliability of chemical systems was the development of methodology wherein reliability 
and availability were obtained through block diagrams (Henley and Gandhi, 1982). A reduction model 
for analyzing the reliability of chemical facilities involving processing units and storage tank was 
subsequently developed (Kardos and Lorenz, 1987). Simulation of chemical process systems with a 
focus on reliability was formulated (Thomas and Zanakis, 1974) which served as a pathway for 
computer models developed with an objective to determine the reliability of complex integrated process 
plant systems. The concept of parallel and standby redundancies was put forth, and dynamic 
Table 2: Agreement of safety indices (Kidam, 2008) 
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programming was applied to determine the optimum configuration of series systems (Rudd, 1962). A 
significant step in reliability engineering was the development of maintenance strategies based on the 
reliability of chemical systems (Gall and Kovacs, 1985). The widely-accepted method of fault tree for 
predicting chemical plant failure served as a breakthrough in the field of reliability analysis (Freeman, 
1983). 
 The developed concepts in reliability theory were effectively applied in process design and 
optimization (Cos, 1973).  A major contribution in this regard was studying and optimizing the 
relationship between system reliabilities and unit reliabilities by sensitivity analysis (Henley and 
Gandhi, 1982). Corrective maintenance scheduling optimization based on reliability analysis served as 
a cornerstone in developing the concept of reliability based maintenance studies (Krishnaswamy and 
Parker, 1984). A reliability centered maintenance model for initial design phases of chemical facilities 
using fuzzy reasoning algorithm and expert judgment was put forth (Fonseca, 2000). Reliability 
optimization was successfully integrated into process design specifically during the conceptual stage 
of design (Goel, 2003).  
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF METHODOLOGY 
3.1 QUANTIFICATION OF PARAMETERS 
 To study the required relationship between inherent safety and equipment reliability, it is 
essential to quantify these parameters. The quantification of inherent safety depends on the design stage 
under consideration (Table 1). Also, reliability has a direct impact on the maintenance downtime and 
associated maintenance cost. however, to quantify this effect, it is essential to consider the 
maintainability of the system since reliability and maintainability share a trade-off which overall 
contributes towards the availability of the system. Maintenance of process systems can be categorized 
into corrective maintenance and predictive maintenance. Corrective maintenance is done after 
equipment failure and its subsequent detection to bring the equipment back to its operating state. 
Predictive maintenance is the maintenance that includes inspection, detection, and repairing of the 
equipment prior to their failure to prevent the development of major faults within the equipment. 
Predictive maintenance is governed by the safety culture and procedures adopted for the chemical 
facilities which are developed during later stages of design. However, corrective maintenance 
downtime of the process is governed by the process equipment involved within the chemical process 
system, specifically the inherent availabilities of the equipment. 
 Since the number and type of different process equipment involved within the process system 
are largely dictated within the early stages of design, the corrective maintenance downtime and its 
associated cost can be estimated during these stages.  This estimation can be carried out from the 
inherent availability of the system that itself depends on the inherent availabilities of the equipment 
involved within the process system. 
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3.2 RELIABILITY DATABASE 
 Various reliability databases have been formulated over the years. Some of the widely-used 
databases include Process equipment reliability database (PERD), Offshore reliability data (OREDA), 
PDS handbook for safety instrumented systems, Instrument reliability network (IRN), European 
industry reliability data bank (EIReDA), Failure rate data in perspective (FARADIP) and Government 
industry data exchange program (GIDEP). 
 Due to the requirement of process equipment failure rate data, PERD and OREDA databases 
are used in this study. 
3.3 DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY 
 The developed methodology for studying the required relationship can be described by the 
following figure: 
 
  
 The first step towards analyzing the required relationship between inherent safety and 
equipment reliability is to select the design stage under consideration and all the possible design 
alternatives. This helps in assimilating the required process data based on the stage of design. This is 
followed by selecting and implementing an appropriate inherent safety quantification method (as per 
Table 1). The next step is to determine the number and type of different process equipment involved in 
the process system from the process flow diagram (PFD) of the system that is generally available during 
early stages of design. This is followed by determining the inherent availabilities of the involved 
Select the 
design stage 
under 
consideration
and evaluate 
the possible 
design 
alternatives 
Select and 
implement 
appropriate 
inherent safety 
quantification 
method based 
on the design 
stage under 
consideration
Determine the 
number and 
type of 
different 
process 
equipment 
involved 
within the 
system  based 
on the process 
flow diagram 
Estimate the 
inherent 
availabilities 
of the 
equipment 
involved 
within the 
system using 
reliability 
database
Estimate the 
inherent 
availability 
and downtime 
of the system 
from the 
equipment 
inherent 
availabilties
Analyse the 
relation 
between 
inherent safety 
and downtime 
using the 
different 
process 
alternatives
Figure 2: Methodology for assessing the required relationship  
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equipment from appropriate reliability databases. The inherent availabilities of the equipment are then 
used to estimate the inherent availability and corrective maintenance downtime of the system by using 
the appropriate series parallel relation between these equipment. Lastly, the required relationship can 
be obtained by analyzing the trend between quantified inherent safety and corrective maintenance 
downtime for all the design alternatives under consideration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION TO PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
 Process selection stage is one of the preliminary stages in process design that is carried out 
after the product to be manufactured is determined. In process selection stage, different chemical 
synthesis routes to manufacture the required product are evaluated, and an optimum process in terms 
of economics and process safety is selected. The design alternatives in process selection stage vary in 
terms of the chemicals, reactions, and equipment involved in the process. The principles of inherent 
safety can be very well understood and implemented during the process selection stage, owing to the 
ease of implementation of ISPs in early stages of design.  
4.2 APPLICATION OF DISCUSSED METHODOLOGY TO PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
 The described methodology in chapter II can be applied to process selection stage. The first 
step in the methodology is to evaluate the design alternatives existing for the design stage under 
consideration.  The design alternatives in process selection stage are the different chemical process 
synthesis routes existing to manufacture the required product. 
4.3 INHERENT SAFETY QUANTIFICATION FOR PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
 The next step in the described methodology is to select an appropriate quantification technique 
for inherent safety. Inherent safety index and i-safe index are deemed to be appropriate for process 
selection stage (Table 2). However, both indices fail to appropriately reflect the effect of all ISPs mainly 
simplification. The principle of simplification is important in this study, since, the number of equipment 
involved in a process directly affect the reliability of the system while simultaneously having an impact 
on the inherent safety of the process through the principle of simplification. Therefore, a hybrid index 
that can consider chemical hazards through i-safe methodology and equipment hazards through ISI 
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methodology and effectively reflects the impact of all ISPs has been developed. The safety index is 
computed by converting chemical, reaction and equipment hazards associated with the design 
alternatives into non-dimensional indices. The chemical hazards that are considered in the computation 
of the safety index are reactivity, toxicity, flammability, and explosiveness of chemicals (both reactants 
and products) involved in the process design alternatives. These hazards are converted into a non-
dimensional index as per i-safe methodology (Palaniappan, 2003, originally based on ISI methodology) 
and are described as follows: 
Flammability index: 
Flammability Nature Score (NF) 
Flash Point > 55 0C Combustible Liquid 1 
Flash Point ≤ 55 0C Flammable liquid 2 
Flash Point < 21 0C Easily Flammable 3 
Flash Point > 0 0C Very Flammable 4 
Flash Point not defined Non-flammable 0 
 
 
 
Explosiveness index: 
Explosiveness (UEL – LEL difference)  
volume % 
Score (NE) 
Non - explosive 0 
0-20 1 
20-45 2 
45-70 3 
70-100 4 
 
 
 
Table 3: Flash point score conversion 
Table 4: Explosiveness score conversion 
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Toxicity index: 
Toxicity (ppm) Score (NT) 
TLV > 10000 1 
TLV ≤  10000 2 
TLV ≤  1000 3 
TLV ≤  100 4 
TLV ≤  10 5 
TLV ≤  1 6 
TLV ≤  0.1 7 
 
 
 
Reactivity index: 
Reactivity Score (NR) 
Normally Stable 0 
Unstable at HTHP conditions 1 
Violent Chemical change at HTHP 2 
Capable of detonation with an initiating source 3 
Capable of detonation at normal temperature and 
pressure 
4 
 
 
 
 Similarly, hazardous aspects of reactions such as the operating conditions of temperature and 
pressure and heat of the reaction are converted into non-dimensional indices as per inherent safety index 
methodology (Heikkila, 1999). The inventory of chemicals required for the process is indirectly 
considered through the  yield of the chemical reactions involved. This yield is again converted into non-
dimensional index as per prototype index for inherent safety methodology (Edwards, 1993). 
Table 5: Toxicity score conversion 
Table 6: Reactivity score conversion 
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Temperature index: 
Operating temperature Score (RT) 
< 0 0C 1 
0 - 70 0C 0 
70 - 150 0C 1 
150 - 300 0C 2 
300 - 600 0C 3 
> 6000C 4 
 
 
 
Pressure index: 
Operating pressure Score (RP) 
0.5 – 5 bar 0 
0 – 0.5 bar or 5-25 bar 1 
25 – 50 bar 2 
50 – 200 bar 3 
200 – 1000 bar 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Temperature score conversion 
Table 8: Pressure score conversion 
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Yield index: 
Yield (%) Score (RY) 
100 0 
90-99 1 
80-89 2 
70-79 3 
60-69 4 
50-59 5 
40-49 6 
30-39 7 
20-29 8 
10-19 9 
0-10 10 
 
 
Note: A lower yield corresponds to a higher score and subsequently a higher safety index as it is 
assumed that reactants in a chemical process are generally more hazardous as compared to the products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Yield score conversion 
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Heat of reaction index: 
Heat of reaction (J/gm) Nature Score (RH) 
≤ 200 J/gm Thermally neutral 0 
< 600 J/gm Mildly exothermic 1 
< 1200 J/gm Moderately exothermic 2 
< 3000 J/gm Strongly exothermic 3 
≥ 3000 J/gm Extremely exothermic 4 
 
 
The process reaction and chemical safety index (PRCSI) is a measure of the hazards relating to 
chemicals and reactions involved in the process and is computed as follows: 
• Individual chemical index (ICI) = NR + NT + NF + NE (ICI is computed for all chemicals 
involved in the process) 
• Individual reaction index (IRI) = RT + RP + RH + RY (IRI is computed for all reactions involved 
in the process) 
• Hazardous chemical index (HCI) = max (ICI) 
• Hazardous reaction index (HRI) = max (IRI) 
• Overall chemical index (OCI) = max (ICI) 
• Overall reaction index (ORI) = ∑ IRI 
• Overall safety index (OSI) = ∑ (OCI + ORI) 
• Worst chemical index (WCI) = max (NR) + max (NT) + max (NF)+ max (NE) 
• Worst reaction index (WRI) = max (RT) + max (RP) + max (RH) + max (RY) 
• Total chemical index (TCI) = ∑ ICI 
• Process reaction and chemical safety index (PRCSI) = ∑ (OSI + WCI + WRI + TCI)/4 
 
Table 10: Heat of reaction conversion 
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Note:  
a) OSI, WCI, WRI, and TCI are considered for the calculation of PRCSI to also evaluate the hazards 
associated with the worst-case scenario possible in a chemical process. 
b) Hazardous chemical index (HCI) and overall chemical index (OCI) are numerically identical. 
 Apart from considering the hazards with respect to chemicals and reactions in a process, it is 
essential to consider the hazards with respect to the equipment involved in the process. Equipment like 
furnaces can act as ignition sources leading to fire and explosion, Similarly, failure in reactors handling 
toxic chemicals can lead to the release of hazardous chemicals to the environment. The scoring of 
equipment in this study is based on inherent safety index methodology (Heikkila, 1999). 
Equipment  Score (IEQ) 
Equipment handling non-flammable, non-toxic 
materials 
0 
Heat Exchangers, pumps, towers & drums 1 
Air-coolers, reactors & high hazard pumps 2 
Compressors & high hazard reactors 3 
Furnaces & fired heaters 4 
 
Table 11: Equipment scoring 
The Equipment Hazard scores are based on: 
Penalties in Dow F&EI, Statistical data listing equipment as the primary cause of incidents and layout 
spacing recommendations as per general design standards. 
The process equipment safety index (PESI) is calculated as, 
PESI = ∑ Nj x IEQ,j for all j 
Where j represents the different types of equipment and Nj represents the number of a specific type of 
equipment involved in the process. 
Finally, the overall process safety index (OPSI) is calculated as, 
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OPSI = PRCSI + PESI 
A higher value of OPSI indicates a more hazardous (i.e. less inherently safer) process. 
 It should be also noted that the quantification of inherent safety through OPSI involves the 
relative weighing of hazards and thus introduces an inbuilt judgment that may not be consistent with 
other safety indices and expert judgments. 
 Since OPSI is used for comparing the inherent safety of design alternatives from hazards with 
respect to involved reactions, chemicals, and equipment in the process, it is important to understand the 
effect of different inherent safety principles on OPSI, which is illustrated in the following diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Minimization: 
Reduced quantity of 
raw materials
(improved yield of 
reaction)
lower value of
Ry
lower value of IRI, 
ORI and OSI 
Substitution:
Replacing a 
hazardous chemical 
with a relatively safer 
one
lower value of
Nr, Nt, Nf and/or Ne
lower value of ICI 
and TCI 
Attenuation:
Reducing the severity 
of operating 
conditions
lower value of
Rt and Rp
lower value of IRI, 
ORI and OSI 
Simplification:
Reducing the number 
of equipment
lesser number of 
values for j in PESI 
calculation
lower value of PESI
Lower value 
of OPSI 
(inherently 
safer process) 
Figure 3:  Impact of inherent safety principles on OPSI  
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4.4 INHERENT AVAILABILITY FOR PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
 After quantifying inherent safety in terms of OPSI. The next step is to estimate the inherent 
availabilities of the equipment involved in the process. Following is the reliability data that has been 
used in this stage acquired from PERD and OREDA databases: 
Equipment MTTF (hrs.) MTTR (hrs.) 
Pumps 33000 27 
Reactors 26300 106 
Heat Exchangers 33000 56 
Three Phase Separator 91000 37 
Flash Drum 91000 27 
Distillation Column 17500 47 
Compressor 11400 39 
Scrubber 
 
12000 100 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter I, most of the process incidents occur during transient operations such 
as shutdown and startup. Thus, a process with higher corrective maintenance downtime can be assumed 
to be a riskier process.  
 As mentioned before, inherent availabilities are used in this study to quantify the corrective 
maintenance downtime of process systems. The advantage of analyzing inherent availability is that it 
is the steady state availability (i.e. it doesn’t vary with time) and is an equipment design parameter. The 
inherent availabilities of the equipment themselves are based on their mean time to failure (MTTF) and 
mean time to repair (MTTR) of the equipment. The inherent availability of an equipment is given by: 
𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒉 =  
𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑭
𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑭+𝑴𝑻𝑻𝑹
   
 The MTTF and MTTR values for general process equipment can be obtained from PERD and 
OREDA databases.  
 In the earlier stages of design, redundant equipment are generally not considered. Thus, the 
equipment in the process system can be assumed to be in series with respect to their reliabilities and 
availabilities. Therefore, the inherent availability of the system can be expressed as: 
Table 12: Equipment reliability data 
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𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒉,𝒔𝒚𝒔 =  ∏ 𝑨𝒊𝒏𝒉,𝒊
𝒏
𝒊
Where, 
Ainh,i is the inherent availability of ith equipment, 
n is the total number of equipment in the process system, 
& Ainh, sys is the inherent availability of the process system. 
Thus, from the process flow diagrams (PFDs) of the process designs, different types and 
number of equipment involved in the process design can be known, and the inherent availability of the 
system can be estimated from the inherent availabilities of equipment involved in the process. The 
corrective maintenance downtime for the system is computed using the following expression: 
𝐀𝐢𝐧𝐡,𝐬𝐲𝐬 = 𝟏 −  
𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞 𝐝𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞
𝐭𝐨𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐞
Finally, by computing OPSI and Ainh,sys for all process design alternatives, the required 
relationship between these parameters can be established for the process selection stage. 
4.5 CASE STUDY FOR PROCESS SELECTION STAGE – ACETIC ACID MANUFACTURE 
The described methodology is applied to the case of Acetic acid manufacturing in the process 
selection stage. Various processes which utilize different chemicals, reactions and equipment have been 
developed for Acetic acid manufacture. The processes considered in this study are Ethylene oxidation 
(U.S. Patent No. 7491843 B2, 2009), Acetaldehyde oxidation (Cheung, 2012), Low-pressure 
carbonylation (Cheung, 2012), Ethane oxidation (Solimon, 2012) and Butane oxidation (Cheung, 
2012). 
 The results obtained by applying the described methodology on the mentioned case study are
as follows: 
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4.6 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DESIGN ALTERNATIVES IN PROCESS SELECTION 
STAGE 
 Apart from analyzing the design alternatives from the perspective of inherent safety, it is 
important to evaluate these alternatives from the aspect of profitability. Since the analysis is carried out 
in earlier stages of design, the economic analysis is carried out based on widely used engineering thumb 
rules and estimation techniques since accurately predicting the economics of these processes is difficult 
due to lack of depth of knowledge of these processes. Following is the procedure used for economic 
analysis: 
• Define the required capacity of plant  
• Estimate the current fixed capital investment (FCI) based on a known fixed capital investment at a 
certain period and chemical engineering plant cost index by: 
Current FCI =  FCI in period ‘T’ x 
current chemical engineering plant cost index 
chemical engineering plant cost index at period T
 
x (
required capacity
capacity for which FCI is known at period T
)
0.6
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Figure 4: Corrective maintenance downtime vs OPSI, Acetic acid case study 
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• Annualize the calculated FCI by assuming appropriate number of expected service years of plant 
•  Estimate the annual operating time of plant from the calculated inherent availability (Ainh) of the 
system by: 
Annual operating time of plant = Total annual time x inherent availability of system 
• Estimate the corrective maintenance labor cost by: 
Corrective maintenance labor cost = Annual operating time x corrective maintenance labor rate x 
(
1
𝐴𝑖𝑛ℎ
− 1)                                                                                                                        (Goel, 2003) 
• Assuming the corrective maintenance material cost is roughly the same as corrective maintenance 
labor cost (Branan, 2005) the overall corrective maintenance cost can be estimated as: 
Overall maintenance cost = 2 x corrective maintenance labor cost 
• Estimate the cost of raw materials required for the desired capacity by appropriate mass balance 
• Estimate the overall production cost (excluding overall maintenance cost) from the cost of raw 
materials by: 
Overall production cost = 3.3 x cost of raw materials                           (Peters and Timmerhaus, 1980) 
• Compute the annualized profit obtained for the given alternative by assuming an appropriate selling 
price of product and using the overall production cost  
4.7 RESULTS FOR PROCESS SELECTION STAGE 
 Following are the results obtained by applying the described methodology and economic 
analysis for process selection stage for the case study of acetic acid manufacture: 
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Design Alternatives 
(1 KTPA capacity) 
Overall process safety 
index (OPSI) 
Corrective 
maintenance 
downtime (days) 
Annualized profit 
(AP) 
 (MM $) 
Ethylene oxidation 29.5 12.78 0.35 
Acetaldehyde 
oxidation 
31.25 14.31 0.73 
Low pressure 
carbonylation 
34.25 13.54 0.82 
Ethane oxidation 35.25 12.34 0.72 
Butane oxidation 38.25 15.73 0.29 
 
 
4.8 TOPSIS OPTIMIZATION 
 Since, the final goal of this study is to select a process that is sufficiently inherently safer while 
simultaneously being inherently available and profitable, a multi-criteria decision analysis method, 
TOPSIS has been implemented. TOPSIS refers to Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to 
Ideal Solution. This method assigns weight to different criteria, normalizes the decision variables and 
finally selects the optimum alternative. In this study, the decision variables for selecting the optimum 
process are inherent safety (in terms of OPSI) and profitability (in terms of annualized profit, AP). The 
corrective maintenance downtime is indirectly reflected in terms of annualized profit and therefore is 
not considered a decision variable. Following is the procedure used for TOPSIS optimization: 
1) Define the decision variables i.e. OPSIi and APi for design alternative i for all design alternatives 
2) Calculate the normalization term for the decision variables by: 
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼 =  √∏ 𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼2 and  𝑁𝐴𝑃 =  √∏ 𝐴𝑃2 
Table 13: Results for process selection stage – Acetic acid case study 
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3) Normalize all decision variables by: 
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖 =
𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼𝑖
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼
 and 𝑁𝐴𝑃,𝑖 =
𝐴𝑃𝑖
𝑁𝐴𝑃
 
4) Assign weights to decision criteria, say 0.3 for inherent safety and 0.7 to annualized profit i.e. 
𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼 = 0.3 and 𝑊𝐴𝑃 = 0.7 
5) Compute weighted decision variables by: 
𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖 = 𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼 𝑥 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖 and 𝑊𝐴𝑃,𝑖 = 𝑊𝐴𝑃 𝑥 𝑁𝐴𝑃,𝑖 
6) Determine the most ideal and most negative ideal solutions for the decision variables. The ideal 
solution should be most inherently safer (i.e. minimum OPSI) and most profitable (i.e. maximum 
annualized profit) while the negative ideal solution should be least inherently safer (i.e. maximum 
OPSI) and least profitable (i.e. minimum annualized profit). 
Ideal solutions: 𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼= min (𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖) and 𝐼𝐴𝑃 = max (𝑊𝐴𝑃,𝑖) 
Negative ideal solutions: 𝑁𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼= max (𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖) and 𝑁𝐼𝐴𝑃 = min (𝑊𝐴𝑃,𝑖) 
7) Determine the distance of the decision variables for a design alternative from ideal and negative 
ideal solutions:  
Ai = √(𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖 −  𝐼𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼)2 + (𝑊𝐴𝑃,𝑖 −   𝐼𝐴𝑃)2  and Bi = √(𝑊𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼,𝑖 − 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝑆𝐼)2 + (𝑊𝐴𝑃,𝑖 −   𝑁𝐴𝑃)2 
8) Compute the relative closeness of all the design alternatives by: 
𝑅𝑖 =  
𝐵𝑖
𝐴𝑖+ 𝐵𝑖
  
9) Finally, rank the design alternatives based on their relative closeness. The optimum design 
alternative will have the highest relative closeness.   
The TOPSIS optimization is carried out for two different sets of weights for inherent safety and 
profitability. Following are the results obtained from the described procedure: 
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 Case I Case II 
Rank Inherent safety weight = 0.3 
Profitability weight = 0.7 
Inherent safety weight = 0.6 
Profitability weight = 0.4 
1 Low-pressure carbonylation Acetaldehyde oxidation 
2 Acetaldehyde oxidation  Low-pressure carbonylation 
3 Ethane oxidation Ethane oxidation 
4 Ethylene oxidation Ethylene oxidation 
5 Butane oxidation Butane oxidation 
 
 
4.9 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR THE CASE STUDY 
 Analyzing the graph obtained between OPSI and corrective maintenance downtime for process 
selection stage (Figure 4), it can be observed that a process that is inherently safer in terms of involved 
reaction, chemicals, and equipment may not necessarily have the least corrective maintenance 
downtime. This is primarily because, in process selection stage OPSI is governed by the inherent safety 
principles of minimization, substitution, attenuation and simplification (Figure 3), whereas corrective 
maintenance downtime depends only on the number and types of equipment present in the process 
system and thus, only depends on the principle of simplification. Therefore, implementing a process 
that’s inherently safer in terms of involved reaction, chemicals and equipment might lead to an increase 
in the associated risk of the system by increasing its corrective maintenance downtime.  
Table 14: Ranking of process routes for Acetic acid case study 
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 In 1972, around 10% of the Acetic acid manufacture was carried out by low-pressure 
carbonylation. However, due to the economic superiority of this process, its dominance has increased 
over the years and currently more than 90% of Acetic acid manufacture is achieved using low-pressure 
carbonylation (Cheung, 2012). Prior to the dominance of low-pressure carbonylation process, a major 
proportion of the Acetic acid was produced by Acetaldehyde oxidation (Hintermann & Labonne, 2007). 
Thus, if regulations to enforce the consideration of inherently safer designs are imposed (i.e. 
transitioning from case I of TOPSIS optimization to case II), upcoming facilities might need to 
reconsider the potential of Acetaldehyde oxidation (or other synthesis routes with comparable 
profitability) for Acetic acid manufacture over low pressure carbonylation due to its higher associated 
inherent safety. This can lead to the implementation of a process that has a higher corrective 
maintenance downtime and thus, ultimately higher associated risk 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 The conceptual stage is the design stage that follows process selection stage. In conceptual 
stage, the chemistry used to manufacture the required product is already determined (in the process 
selection stage). However, the configuration of the flow-sheet (process flow diagram) is to be figured 
out. Thus, the available design alternatives in this stage are similar in terms of reactions and chemicals. 
However, they vary in terms of the number and types of different process equipment employed. 
Different configuration of process flow diagrams can have different advantages, and usually, the most 
profitable configuration is selected. 
5.2 APPLICATION OF DISCUSSED METHODOLOGY TO CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 The described methodology in Chapter II can be applied to the conceptual stage as well. The 
first step in the methodology is to evaluate the design alternatives existing for the design stage under 
consideration.  The design alternatives in the conceptual stage are the different configuration of process 
flow diagrams for a selected chemistry existing to manufacture the required product. 
5.3 INHERENT SAFETY QUANTIFICATION FOR CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 Since i-safe and ISI index are proved to be suitable in early stages of design, the developed 
hybrid index (mentioned in chapter IV) based on these indices is used for the quantification for inherent 
safety. It is important to note that since the design alternatives for this stage are similar in terms of 
reactions and chemicals used, the values of PRCSI is same for all design alternatives. However, the 
value of PESI varies due to variation in number and types of different process equipment employed 
depending on the process configuration.  
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5.4 INHERENT AVAILABILITY FOR CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 The computation of inherent availability and corrective maintenance downtime of the system 
in conceptual stage is similar to that in process selection stage. The end results obtained by applying 
the described methodology to the conceptual stage is the relation between OPSI and corrective 
maintenance downtime of the system for all the design alternatives. 
5.5 CASE STUDY FOR CONCEPTUAL STAGE – HYDRODEALKYLATION OF TOLUENE 
TO BENZENE 
 The described methodology is applied to the case of Hydrodealkylation of Toluene to Benzene 
in the conceptual stage of design. The processes considered are described by Douglas, 1988, Bouton, 
2008, Konda, 2006 and Mata, 2003.  
Douglas process configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reactor 
Gas liquid separator 
Distillation columns 
Furnace 
Figure 6: Process configuration (Douglas, 1988) 
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 The Douglas configuration is the conventional process flow configuration for 
Hydrodealkylation of Toluene to Benzene. Hydrogen and Toluene are heated to the required process 
temperature and passed through a reactor where the main product Benzene is obtained along with by-
products methane, Di-phenyl, and Hydrogen. The hydrogen in the product stream is separated and 
recycled back to the feed. The remaining by-products are passed through a train of distillation columns 
where the products and by-products are separated, and the unreacted toluene is sent back to the feed. 
Bouton process configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Bouton configuration differs from the conventional process configuration in the sense that 
the gaseous stream from gas-liquid separator split into two components, first stream component is 
directly sent to the feed, and the other part is sent via a membrane separator where the hydrogen gas is 
separated from other components and recycled back to the feed. The advantage of this process is the 
reduction in fresh hydrogen requirements due to hydrogen recovery. 
 
Distillation columns 
Gas liquid separator 
Reactor 
Distillation columns 
Furnace 
Figure 7: Process configuration (Bouton, 2008) 
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Konda process configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 In Konda configuration, the entire gaseous stream from the gas-liquid separator is sent to the 
membrane separator where hydrogen is separated from other components and is recycled back to the 
feed. The advantage of this process configuration is that the recycled gas is virtually CH4 free (which 
was acting as a heat carrier in previous configurations) thus improving the heat economy of the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distillation columns 
Furnace 
Gas liquid separator 
Reactor 
Figure 8: Process configuration (Konda, 2006) 
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Mata process configuration: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Mata process configuration, heat integration is achieved by using the product stream from the reactor 
to preheat the incoming reactants, this improves the heat economy of the process and eliminates the 
need of quenching the product stream. 
The results obtained by applying the described methodology to the described case study are as follows: 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mata, 2003 
Douglas, 1988 
Konda, 2006 
Bouton, 2008 
Distillation columns 
Furnace 
Gas liquid separator Reactor 
Figure 9: Process configuration (Mata, 2003) 
Figure 10: Corrective maintenance downtime vs. OPSI for Toluene case study  
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5.6 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DESIGN ALTERNATIVES IN CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 An economic analysis similar to process selection stage is carried out at the conceptual stage 
for a capacity of 300 TPA. The data for economic analysis is based on Fischer and Iribarren, 2011. In 
general, the addition of ceramic membrane separator can lead to substantial increase in capital cost and 
may counter other benefits such as reduction in hydrogen requirement and improvement in heat 
economy as compared to the conventional configuration for Bouton and Konda process configuration 
respectively. However, the improvement in heat economy in Mata configuration is substantial and leads 
to higher profitability. 
5.7 RESULTS FOR CONCEPTUAL STAGE 
 Following are the results obtained by applying the described methodology and economic 
analysis for the conceptual stage for the case study of Hydrodealkylation of Toluene to Benzene: 
Design Alternatives 
(300 TPA capacity) 
Overall process safety 
index (OPSI) 
Corrective 
maintenance 
downtime (days) 
Annualized profit 
(AP) 
 (MM $) 
Douglas 46.25 18.66 0.49 
Bouton  55.25 27.38 0.44 
Konda 48.25 23.88 0.27 
Mata 45.25 18.38 0.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Results for conceptual stage – Toluene case study 
35 
 
5.8 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR THE CASE STUDY – HYDRODEALKYLATION OF 
TOLUENE TO BENZENE 
 From the graph obtained for the conceptual stage (Figure 10), it can be observed that the 
corrective maintenance downtime of process systems increases with increase in OPSI. A detailed 
analysis reveals that the number of equipment involved in the process systems increases as we move 
from a process with lower OPSI and lower corrective maintenance downtime to a process with a higher 
OPSI and a higher corrective maintenance downtime. Due to similarity of process systems in terms of 
reactions and chemicals in the conceptual stage, inherent safety principles of minimization, substitution 
and attenuation become redundant, Therefore OPSI is essentially governed by the principle of 
simplification wherein a process with lesser number of equipment will have a lower value of OPSI and 
thus will be inherently safer. Similarly, corrective maintenance downtime of process systems increases 
with the number of equipment involved in the system. This explains the trend observed in the results 
for the conceptual stage (Figure 10). In terms of economics, a process with least corrective maintenance 
downtime may not be the most profitable, since the cost of corrective maintenance is generally a very 
small fraction of the overall production cost. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION TO DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE 
 The next stage under consideration for analysis of the required relationship is detailed 
engineering stage. One of the key aspects of detailed engineering stage is the design of process 
equipment involved in the project. Thus, focusing on this stage allows us to obtain the required 
relationship for a particular equipment as compared to obtaining the relationship for the entire process 
system (as done in process selection and conceptual stage). This stage also helps in determining the 
effect of process parameters such as operating temperature and pressure on inherent safety and 
equipment reliability.  
6.2 APPLICATION OF DESCRIBED METHODOLOGY TO DETAILED ENGINEERING 
STAGE 
 The described methodology in Chapter II can also be applied to detailed engineering stage with 
certain modifications. The first step in the methodology is to evaluate the design alternatives existing 
for the design stage under consideration.  The design alternatives in detailed engineering stage for an 
equipment can be the same equipment design under different operating conditions. The suitable range 
of operating conditions for an equipment such as a reactor is generally governed by thermodynamics 
and kinetics of the reaction along with mass and heat transfer occurring within the equipment. Also 
since, the focus of this stage is the design of an individual equipment and not the entire process system, 
it becomes essential to analyze reliability alone rather than focusing on availability as the reliability 
(specifically the static reliability) can be modelled as a function of the operating conditions whereas, 
the maintainability of the equipment can be considered to be independent of operating conditions. 
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The modified methodology for detailed engineering stage can be described as: 
 
 
 
6.3 INHERENT SAFETY QUANTIFICATION FOR DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE 
 Since, detailed engineering stage is one of the later stages of design, Dow F&EI is deemed to 
be suitable for quantification of inherent safety (as per Table 1). Dow F&EI is widely used in the process 
and allied industries for quantification of hazards associated with a processing facility and has been 
revised multiple times since its formulation.  The quantification of Dow F&EI is mainly based on 
general process hazards such as exothermicity of the reaction, ease of material handling and transfer, 
access to emergency equipment, drainage and spill control measures at the facility, special process 
hazards such as toxicity of materials involved, whether the process is sub-atmospheric, closeness of 
operation to flammable range of materials, possibility of leakage, possibility of dust explosion and 
lastly on material hazards such as reactivity and flammability. The Dow F&EI calculation in this study 
is based on Dow Fire and Explosion index hazard classification guide, 7th edition. 
6.4 RELIABILITY CALCULATION FOR DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE 
 The formulated methodology for detailed engineering stage is described using an example of 
reactor design. The third step of the described methodology requires the quantification of reliability of 
the equipment (i.e. reactor) with respect to operating conditions, the mode of failure for reactor under 
consideration is bursting due to excess pressure and thus, the failure probability (mathematical 
Evaluate the 
possible design 
alternatives for an 
equipment based on 
the suitable range 
of operating 
conditions
Select and implement 
appropriate inherent 
safety quantification 
method for detailed 
engineering stage
Model the 
reliability of the 
equipment as a 
function of the 
operating 
conditions
Analyse the relation 
between inherent 
safety and 
equipment 
reliability using the 
different design 
alternatives (i.e. for 
the entire range of   
operating 
conditions)
Figure 11: Modified methodology for detailed engineering stage 
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counterpart of reliability) can be modelled as a function of pressure inside the reactor. The relation 
between this failure probability and operating pressure has been described by Arnold, 1972. In this 
study, the induced stress in the reactor (due to internal/operating pressure) and the allowable stress of 
the material of the reactor are assumed to follow a normal distribution, and the overlapping of these 
distributions governs the failure probability.  
6.5 APPLICATION OF DESCRIBED METHODOLOGY FOR DETAILED ENGINEERING 
STAGE 
 The problem of reactor design used in this study is partly based on reactor design described by 
Suardin, 2005.  The design problem is described as follows: 
• Reaction: A  B 
• Feasible range of operating pressure (P): 8 to 14 atm 
• Required annual capacity: 645 million lbs of B  
• Reaction rate constant (k): 0.0025 s-1 
• Feasible conversion of reaction: 60 % (defined by mass) 
• Molecular weight of A: 100 lb.mol/mol 
• Temperature of reaction: 800°C 
• Material of construction of reactor: A312 alloy steel (selected as per operating conditions) with 
maximum allowable working stress (M) of 17 atm. 
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6.6 GOVERNING EQUATIONS FOR DESCRIBED METHODOLOGY FOR THE DESIGN OF 
A REACTOR 
 The governing equations for described methodology for reactor design can be broadly divided 
into three sets of equations, equations pertaining to calculating reactor dimensions, equations for 
reliability calculations and equations for Dow F&EI calculations. 
Equations for reactor dimension calculation: 
• Conversion of reaction with respect to mass (X) = 
𝑊𝐴0− 𝑊𝐴
𝑊𝐴0
 
Where WA0 and WA are initial and final mass of A respectively. 
• Volume of reactor (V) = 
𝐹𝐴0
𝑘 𝐶𝐴0
  [(1+∈) ln(
1
1−𝑋
) − ∈ 𝑋] 
Where FA0 is the initial flow rate of A, CA0 is the initial concentration of A and ∈ is the coefficient of 
volume expansion. 
• Volume of reactor (V) = 
𝜋
4
𝐷2𝐿 
• Length to diameter ratio of reactor (r) = 𝐿/𝐷 
Where D and L are the internal diameter and length of reactor respectively. 
• Residence time of reactor (Γ) = 
𝑉
𝑣0
 
• Design pressure of reactor (Pd) = exp(0.60608 + 0.91615 ln 𝑃 + 0.0015655 (ln 𝑃)2)                       
(Seider, 2004) 
Where, 𝑣0 is the initial flow rate of A. 
• Thickness of reactor wall (t) = 
𝑃𝐷 𝑥 (
𝐷
2
)
2𝑀−0.6 𝑃𝐷   
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Equations for Dow F&EI calculation: 
The main equations for Dow F&EI calculations are as follows: 
• 𝐹3 =  𝐹1 𝑥 𝐹2 
• 𝐹&𝐸𝐼 = 𝑀𝐹 𝑥 𝐹3  
Where, F1, F2, and F3 are the general process hazard factor, special process hazard factor, and process 
unit hazard factor. 
MF is the material factor. 
The Dow F&EI index is calculated for the reactor at different values of operating pressure (from 8 to 
14 atm) and a sensitivity analysis is performed as per the procedure described by Suardin, 2005. 
The obtained equation relating Dow F&EI to operating pressure is as follows: 
• 𝐹&𝐸𝐼 =  1.409 𝑥 𝑃 + 112.27 
Equations for reliability calculation: 
• Mean hoop stress in the reactor (Sh) = 
𝑃 (
𝐷
2
)
𝑡
                                                             (Arnold, 1972) 
• Standard deviation of hoop stress (σh) =  
𝜎𝑝(
𝐷
2
)
𝑡
                                                        (Arnold, 1972) 
• Where, 𝜎𝑝 is the standard deviation of operating pressure. 
• Mean induced stress in reactor (Si) = 
𝑆ℎ+𝑃
2
                                                              (Arnold, 1972) 
• Standard deviation of induced stress (σi) =  
1
2
 √𝜎𝑝
2 +  𝜎ℎ
2                                      (Arnold, 1972) 
• Failure probability of reactor (F) = =  0.0014(𝑚4)  −  0.0267(𝑚3) +  0.178(𝑚2) −
 0.5011(𝑚) +  0.5055 
Where, m is an integral parameter given by, 
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• 𝑚 =  
−𝑆𝑖+ 𝑆𝑎
√(𝜎𝑖
2+ 𝜎𝑚
2 )
 
Where σm is the standard deviation of yield point. 
• Reliability of reactor (R) = 1 - F 
Note: The polynomial equation for F is obtained by carrying out a regression analysis of F and m values 
as described by Arnold, 1972 and represents the overlapping probability of distribution of induced and 
allowable stress.  
Following assumptions are made for the reactor design: 
• The reactor length to diameter ratio (r) is 5. 
• Initial flow rate of A (𝑣0) is 100 ft
3/s 
• The reactor follows ideal plug flow and is isothermal in nature. 
• The pressure relief valve is set at 15 atm. 
• The standard deviation of operating pressure (𝜎𝑝) is 10 % of the mean. 
• The standard deviation of yield point (σm) is 15% of maximum allowable stress. 
6.7 RESULTS OBTAINED FOR DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE  
 The described methodology is applied for the pressure range of 8 to 14 atm. The results 
obtained are as follows: 
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Figure 12: Reliability vs. Dow F&EI for reactor design 
  
 
Figure 13: Failure probability, Dow F&EI vs. operating pressure for reactor design 
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6.8 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR DETAILED ENGINEERING STAGE 
 As the value of Dow F&EI increases, the reliability of reactor decreases. This trend (Figure 12) 
exists because as pressure increases, the value of Dow F&EI increases due to an increase in the value 
of special process hazard factor (F2). This essentially implies that the process becomes more hazardous 
at a higher value of pressure. Thus, ultimately, the process becomes less inherently safer owing to the 
principle of attenuation.  Reliability subsequently decreases with increase in pressure as this leads to an 
increased overlapping of induced and allowable stress distributions. Thus, for detailed engineering 
design stage, inherent safety and reliability decrease simultaneously with the pressure of the reactor. 
An important point to note is that at Dow F&EI value of 128 (Figure 13), which is deemed to be 
intermediately hazardous as per AIChE standards (Dow, 1994), the failure probability of reactor is as 
high as 0.25. Thus, in the event of failure of all layers of protection designed to prevent bursting of the 
reactor (such as basic control systems, safety instrumented systems such as pressure relief valve and 
others), there is a 0.25 probability of the reactor bursting. This severity of the situation is not reflected 
by the Dow F&EI value. Another important observation from this analysis is that, as the operating 
pressure of the reactor increases, the value of Dow F&EI and failure probability of reactor 
simultaneously increase as well (Figure 13). However, the rate of increase in failure probability of 
reactor is substantially higher than the rate of increase of Dow F&EI. 
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CHAPTER VII 
APPLICATION OF DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY TO INCIDENT CASE STUDIES 
7.1 INTRODUCTION TO INCIDENT CASE STUDIES 
 Apart from serving as a tool for designing of chemical projects, the developed methodology 
can be used for analysis of past process safety incidents. This study focuses on the incident of T2 
Laboratories explosion and fire and Bhopal gas leak incident. The application of described 
methodology to these incidents not only provides a novel view towards the failure mechanism but also 
serves as validation for the methodology. 
7.2 T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION AND FIRE 
 On December 19, 2007, a fire and explosion occurred at T2 Laboratories in Jacksonville, 
Florida (CSB, 2009). T2 Laboratories Inc. manufactured specialty chemicals, mainly gasoline 
additives. This incident resulted in the death of 4 employees and injured 32 (including 4 employees). 
The 28 public members were working in neighboring areas (CSB, 2009). The explosion occurred in a 
reactor manufacturing methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl (MCMT). MCMT is used as a 
supplement for leaded gasoline.  The impact of the explosion was so immense that the debris of the 
exploded reactor was found at a distance of one mile and the shock waves resulting from explosion 
damaged buildings at a radius of a quarter mile from the facility.  
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7.3 TIMELINE OF T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION AND FIRE 
 The events leading to T2 Laboratories explosion and fire can be described by the following 
timeline:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7:30 am
•T2 Laboratories start manufacturing its 175th batch of MCMT loading the reactor 
with the raw materials 
7:30 -
11:00 am 
•An outside operator loads the reactor with sodium metal manually and seals the 
reactor
11:00 am
•The process operator begans heating in the batch reactor, thus, initiating the 
reaction while monitoring the process parameters. After melting of sodium, the 
process operator starts the agitator
11:23 pm
•An outside operator notifies the owners of a cooling problem on the direction of the 
process operator and requests them to arrive at the site 
few 
minutes 
later
•One of the owners arrives at the control room to evaluate the situation 
1:33 pm
•The reactor bursts leading to release of its contents killing the owner and the 
process operator in the control room and two site operators trying to evacauate from 
the affected reactor
Figure 14: Timeline for T2 laboratories explosion and fire (CSB, 2009) 
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7.4 ROOT CAUSES FOR T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION AND FIRE 
 Following are the root and contributing causes identified for the incident (CSB, 2009): 
• T2 Laboratories were unaware of the hazards associated while manufacturing MCMT 
• The cooling system for the reactor manufacturing MCMT was vulnerable to single point failure 
owing to lack of other protection layers. 
• The relief system for the reactor manufacturing MCMT was inaccurately sized and thus, was 
ineffective in providing the required relief for the runaway reaction.  
7.5 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION AND FIRE 
 Chemical safety board carried out a detailed investigation of the incident. The energy of 
explosion was estimated to be 1400 tons TNT equivalent (CSB, 2009). The explosion occurred due to 
a runaway reaction leading to uncontrolled temperature and pressure elevation. CSB converged on the 
failure of the cooling system as the primary cause leading to the explosion based on witness interviews 
and elimination of other likely causes. CSB conducted laboratory testing of the recipe used by T2 
Laboratories and observed a runaway reaction occurring at a temperature of 3900 F apart from the 
required reaction occurring at 3500F. The owners of T2 Laboratories were unaware of this runaway 
reaction leading to the improper design of cooling and relief systems. The reactor involved in the 
explosion was constructed in 1962 and bought by T2 Laboratories in 2001. After purchasing the reactor, 
certain modifications were carried out leading to decrease in maximum allowable pressure of the reactor 
from 1200 psig to 600 psig. 
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7.6 APPLICATION OF DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY TO T2 LABORATORIES 
EXPLOSION AND FIRE INCIDENT 
 The methodology described for detailed engineering stage (Figure 11) was applied to the 
incident of T2 Laboratories explosion and fire with slight modifications. Since the dimensions of the 
reactor are known, Dow F&EI and reliability of the reactor can be directly evaluated. An important 
aspect that can be understood is the variation in Dow F&EI and reliability of the reactor as the pressure 
of reaction continuously increases due to the occurrence of a runaway reaction. 
Following data has been used for application of the developed methodology to T2 laboratories 
explosion and fire: 
Incident data (CSB, 2009): 
• Reactor Volume: 2000 gallon 
• Reactor thickness: 3 inch 
• Operating pressure: 50 psig 
• Rate of pressure increase: 32000 psig/min 
• Maximum allowable working pressure of reactor: 600 psig 
• Raw materials: Molten sodium metal, methylcyclopentadiene (MCPD) dimer and diethylene 
glycol dimethyl ether 
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Following assumptions were made based on engineering judgments due to lack of data: 
• The reactor length to diameter ratio is 5 
• The standard deviation of operating pressure: 35% of mean of operating pressure 
• The standard deviation of yield point is 15% of maximum allowable stress 
7.7 RESULTS FOR DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY TO T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION 
AND FIRE INCIDENT 
 Following is the plot obtained by applying the developed methodology to T2 laboratories 
explosion and fire incident:  
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case study 
 
 
49 
 
 As mentioned previously, one of the contributing causes towards this incident was the decrease 
in maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) of the reactor from 1200 psig to 600 psig. Following 
are the results obtained after 10 centiseconds from the onset of runaway reaction for MAWPs of 1200 
psig and 600 psig from the developed methodology. 
MAWP (psig) Dow F&EI Reactor reliability 
1200 246.67 0.9999 
600 246.67 0.5588 
 
 
7.8 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR TO T2 LABORATORIES EXPLOSION CASE STUDY 
 Application of developed methodology to the case study of T2 Laboratories explosion and fire 
reveals that Dow F&EI although, can capture the increasing hazard associated due to rising pressure 
from runaway reaction in the reactor, it fails to increase at the same rate as the probability of failure of 
the reactor due to excess pressure. It is also important to note that, the initial value of Dow F&EI is 
considerably high since molten sodium (highly reactive in nature and thus, having a high material 
factor) is involved in the reaction. Also, the methodology can predict the decrease in reliability of 
reactor (Table 16) due to a decrease in its MAWP which is not reflected by the Dow F&EI value (since 
F&EI considers the relief set pressure and not MAWP of the reactor). This result is in alignment with 
the analysis from CSB report. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 16: F&EI and Reliability at different MAWPs after 10 centiseconds of runaway 
reaction 
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7.9 BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT 
 The Bhopal gas leak incident also referred to as ‘Bhopal gas disaster’ occurred on the night of 
2nd December 1984 in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. It is estimated that around 8000 fatalities resulted 
from this incident within 2 weeks, which was followed further by an additional 8000 fatalities resulting 
due to gas leak related diseases over the years (Eckerman, 2004). This incident has been attributed to 
558,125 injuries which include permanently disabling injuries as well (Dubey, 2010). The leak occurred 
in a tank (referred to as tank E610) storing liquid methyl isocyanate (MIC). It is believed that the 
incident occurred due to water seeping into the storage tank which resulted in an exothermic runaway 
reaction leading to a rapid elevation in temperature and pressure. This runaway reaction is believed to 
be accelerated by contaminants, higher outside temperature, and the presence of iron from corroded 
steel pipes (Eckerman, 2004). 
 
7.10 TIMELINE OF BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT 
 The events leading to Bhopal gas leak incident can be described by the following timeline:
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7.11 ROOT CAUSES FOR BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT 
Following are the root and contributing causes identified for the incident (Willey, 2006): 
• Management decision to have the scrubber system in standby mode to reduce operating 
expenses 
• Management decision to remove coolant from the refrigeration system responsible for cooling 
tank E610 
• Lack of emergency response and community awareness  
• Lack of knowledge and awareness about the hazards associated with MIC 
• Inadequate/improper community planning, presence of residential area near hazardous 
chemical plant  
December, 
2, 1984
•Tank E610 storing 41 tonnes of liquid methyl isocyanate 
11:00 pm
•A slightly higher pressure of 171.3 kPa is observed in tank E610
12:15 am
•The pressure indicator indicates a severly high pressure of 481.3 kPa in tank E610 
112:45 am
•Concrete slab present above tank E610 cracks and MIC vapors are released in the 
atmospehere due to opening of relief valve 
2:00 am
•The relief valve of the affected tank E610 repositioned and the leak stopped 
Figure 16: Timeline for Bhopal gas leak incident (Etowa, 2002) 
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7.12 INCIDENT INVESTIGATION OF BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT  
 A report analyzing the Bhopal gas leak was put forth by Retired Vice President, Health, Safety 
and Environmental Programs, Union Carbide Corporation (Browning, 1993). As per this report, a 
disgruntled employee intentionally added water to the storage tank to spoil the batch of MIC. A report 
based on witness interviews, examination of plant logs, scientific experiments and examination of plant 
equipment concluded that the incident was caused due to direct water connection to tank by an 
employee and not by water washing off process filter lines (Kalekar, 1988). However, this theory has 
been subject to argument, has received severe criticism over the years. Although, it is widely accepted 
that safety systems designed for the tank were unable to handle the conditions developed at the time of 
the incident (Diamond, 1985).  
7.13 APPLICATION OF DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY TO BHOPAL GAS LEAK 
INCIDENT 
 The methodology applied to the incident of T2 Laboratories explosion and fire was applied to 
Bhopal gas leak as well. The variation in Dow F&EI with respect to internal pressure has already been 
formulated (Etowa, 2002). The application of this methodology to the case study of Bhopal gas leak 
incident reveals the variation in reliability and Dow F&EI with respect to an elevation in internal 
pressure caused due to a runaway reaction. 
Following data has been used for application of the developed methodology to Bhopal gas leak incident: 
Incident data (Etowa, 2002): 
• Diameter of tank: 2.44 m 
• Operating (internal) pressure: 150 kPa 
• Dow F&EI: 0.01 x P + 237                                                            (based on data from Etowa, 
2002) 
• Maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP): 381 kPa 
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Following assumptions were made based on engineering judgments due to lack of data: 
• The standard deviation of operating pressure: 35% of mean of operating pressure 
• The standard deviation of yield point is 15% of maximum allowable stress 
7.14 RESULTS FOR DEVELOPED METHODOLOGY TO BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT  
 Following is the plot obtained by applying the developed methodology to Bhopal gas leak 
incident:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.15 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS FOR BHOPAL GAS LEAK INCIDENT 
 Application of developed methodology to the case study of Bhopal gas leak reveals that Dow 
F&EI can reflect the increasing hazard associated due to an elevation in pressure from runaway reaction 
in the reactor. However, it fails to increase at the same rate as the probability of failure of the tank due 
to excess pressure as observed in the case of T2 Laboratories fire and explosion. It is also important to 
Figure 17: Dow F&EI, Reliability vs. operating pressure for Bhopal gas leak 
incident 
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note that, the range of value of Dow F&EI is considerably high since MIC (highly reactive in nature, 
hazardous to human health and thus, having a high material factor) is involved in the reaction. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 In this work, the relationship between inherently safer design and equipment reliability has 
been investigated. The aim of this study was to determine the possibility of risk escalation caused due 
to lowering of system reliability during the implementation of inherent safety principles applied with 
an objective to lower the consequence element of risk. This lowering of system reliability can lead to 
an undesired increase in likelihood element of risk ultimately leading to an increase in the associated 
risk. 
 This study included the development of a safety index (OPSI) for earlier design stages that 
could effectively reflect the impact of inherent safety principles (including simplification) on the 
associated inherent safety of a design alternative. During the analysis of process selection stage using 
this index, it was observed that a process alternative that is inherently safer in terms of the reactions, 
chemicals, and equipment involved, may be associated with a higher corrective maintenance downtime 
and therefore may in turn be riskier since most of the process incidents occur during maintenance, 
startup, and shutdown. 
 When a similar analysis was carried out for the conceptual stage, the number of equipment 
involved in a process alternative emerged as a critical factor with regards to inherent safety and 
reliability of the alternative. It was observed that a process with a relatively lesser number of equipment 
might be inherently safer (owing to the principle of simplicity) and more inherently available. 
 Finally, when the required relationship was studied for a specific equipment such as the reactor 
during detailed engineering stage, the severity of operating conditions was determined to play a crucial 
role in regards to inherent safety and reliability of the reactor. Operating at lesser severity of operating 
pressure, the reactor was deemed to be relatively inherently safer and more reliable, and these 
parameters were observed to deteriorate at different rates with an increase in the severity of operating 
pressure. 
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 An important conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the relationship between 
inherent safety and reliability is complicated and varies during different stages of design (Figure 4, 10 
& 12). The impact of inherent safety principles on the overall inherent safety of the design alternative 
is governed by the design stage under consideration, and the cumulative impact of these principles 
decreases along with the progression of design resulting in this complicated relationship. Application 
of the developed methodology to the case studies of T2 Laboratories explosion and fire and Bhopal 
leak incident revealed that the quantification of inherent safety in terms of non-dimensional indices 
(OPSI or Dow F&EI) is plagued with an inbuilt judgement (relative weighing) of hazards that may not 
be reflective of the overall risk associated with a design alternative as observed through reliability 
analysis.  
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CHAPTER IX 
FUTURE WORK 
 The described study has various scopes for improvement. Apart from relying on non-
dimensional safety indices for quantification of inherent safety, carrying out a risk assessment of the 
design alternatives can be quite beneficial and in turn, eliminates the inbuilt judgment intrinsic in these 
safety indices calculation. This will help in establishing a relationship between corrective maintenance 
downtime of design alternatives and their associated risk, thus shedding light on the phenomenon of 
occurrence of process incidents during maintenance downtime: startup and shutdown and this 
relationship can serve as a tool for risk estimation in earlier stages of design. 
 Also, analyzing the effect of improving system reliability by providing redundant equipment 
(for those equipment prone to frequent failures) on inherent safety and overall risk of a design 
alternative can prove to be highly beneficial in the field of process design. 
 Lastly, more focus can be emphasized on risk-based inherently safer design as compared to 
hazard based inherently safer design, wherein new techniques and methodologies can be developed that 
can accurately estimate the risk associated with a design alternative in the earlier design stages based 
on the depth of knowledge about the process available at that stage, by focusing on the risk determining 
factors (such as toxicity, flammability, system reliability) of that alternative. 
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